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Deceptive Patents: Deconstructing Juicy Whip
Moral utility largely prevents the granting of a patent if the patent
would be injurious to the well-being of society. The moral utility doctrine
has prevailed through much of American patent history and still endures
in many parts of the world. In Juicy Whip I, the Federal Circuit chose to
abandon the doctrine, but the court’s rationale in support of the decision
was ill-suited. The court’s holding sanctioned deceptive patent
applications but, intentionally or unintentionally, neglected applicable
unfair competition, free speech, and consumer deception doctrines. In
light of the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
deceptive patents should be barred, because they convey no inherently
useful qualities beyond deceiving consumers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are browsing the internet and an advertisement pops
up. You are interested in the product presented and click on the ad.
The link sends you to a separate webpage that does not actually sell
the advertised product. Instead, it sells a knock-off product of lower
grade and quality. This would likely be a frustrating scenario for many
people. Now, imagine that the company that devised such a scenario
received a patent on its advertising methods. In other words, the
government actually rewarded this company for developing this
deceptive bait-and-switch. As frustrating as it is, this is a possible
scenario 1 in the current state of intellectual property law due to the
erosion of the moral utility doctrine and the development of
deceptive patents.
This Note calls for the revival and codification of the moral utility
doctrine for deceptive patent applications. Specifically, it examines the
history of the moral utility doctrine, from its inception up to its
erosion in the 1999 case Juicy Whip I. As this Note will explain, the
patent in question in Juicy Whip I is intentionally manufactured for
point-of-sale deception, a pernicious type of deception. Moreover, the
Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Juicy Whip I is flawed. First, although
the court applauded the utility of post-sale imitative products, the
court neglected the complications that result from condoning
consumer confusion and deception at the point-of-sale. Second, the
court turned a blind eye to the moral question at issue because
Congress has not addressed deception as it applies to patents. In doing
so, they failed to acknowledge well-established trademark and false
advertising laws aimed to avert consumer deception. Congress need
not expressly restrict deceptive patents where other laws and
regulations seek to prohibit similar deceptive acts. Finally, the
incongruity between deceptive patents and the utilitarian purposes of
patent law should be evident. Specifically, the Constitution marshals
the Patent and Trademark Office to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts. Promoting point-of-sale deception is contrary to
prevailing public policy.

1. This scenario assumes that the software claims are drafted such that they overcome
an Alice rejection. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
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This Note proceeds as follows: Part II explores the history and
context of the moral utility doctrine. Namely, it will explain that the
moral utility doctrine fits within the context of general patent utility
and draws upon international origins and its affirmation throughout
early American law. Part III examines Juicy Whip I, the foremost case
affecting the moral utility doctrine. This section challenges the novelty
of the Juicy Whip patent and rebuts the court’s holding by invoking
trademark and First Amendment laws that seek to prevent consumer
deception. Part IV juxtaposes deceptive patents against the utilitarian
purposes of patent law. Part V discusses drawbacks associated with
reviving the moral utility doctrine. Finally, Part VI suggests a course
of action to reinstate the moral utility doctrine as it applies to
deceptive patents.
II. MORAL UTILITY HISTORY AND CONTEXT
Moral utility is a subset of the utility doctrine, which draws its
authority from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, 2 whereby
Congress is empowered “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 3
The First Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1790 to codify the
Intellectual Property Clause. 4 Under it, a person who “hath . . .
invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine,
or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used”
shall be granted a patent “if [the patent examiner] shall deem the

2. One of the objectives of this paper is to highlight the purpose of the Intellectual
Property Clause. See Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner:
Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J.
2331, 2331 (2003) (noting that the Copyright and Patent Clause “until very recently . . .
received little attention from constitutional law scholars”).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 634–41 (2010) (noting that scholars, courts, and legislators have interpreted the term
“useful art” to mean “technological art” or process).
4. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Congress quickly responded to
the bidding of the Constitution by enacting the Patent Act of 1790 during the second session
of the First Congress.”).
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invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important, to cause
letters patent to be made out in the name of the United States.” 5
The requirement that a patent be useful, broadly known as the
utility requirement, has four varieties derived by the courts: 6
substantial utility, specific utility, credible utility, and moral utility.7
This paper focuses almost exclusively on moral utility.
A. Moral Utility’s International Origins
Moral utility, the requirement that patents should not be granted
for inventions that are contrary to morality or public policy,
originated, like other patent doctrines, in Europe. The 1624 Statute
of Monopolies, the first English patent law, contained a clause
preventing issuance of patents that were “contrary to the law,”
“mischievous to the state,” or “generally inconvenient.” 8 Later, the
moral utility doctrine was again incorporated into one of the first
international treaties addressing intellectual property, the 1883 Paris
Convention. The Convention stated that the partnering countries
could not grant patents that “mislead the public.” 9 In the nineteenth
century, European countries began to incorporate an “ordre public
[public order] exception” into various treaties, and eventually the
language disallowing patents that were “contrary to ordre public or
morality” was incorporated into the 1963 Strasbourg Convention on
the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for
Invention. 10 This language prevailed through the unification of the
European patent system in 1973, whereby all the negotiating

5. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (amended 1793)
(emphasis added).
6. UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE MPEP § 2107.01(I) (9th ed. rev. 2015) (“Courts have used the labels ‘practical
utility,’ ‘substantial utility,’ or ‘specific utility’ to refer to this aspect of the ‘useful invention’
requirement of 35 U.S.C. 101.”).
7. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 4.01, 4.04(2)(c)(iv) (2000).
8. Chris Dent, ‘Generally Inconvenient’: The 1624 Statute of Monopolies as Political
Compromise, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 415, 442 (2009).
9. PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 326 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley
eds., 2014).
10. Id. at 327. This was signed by Italy, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands,
Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, Austria, Cyprus,
and Switzerland.
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countries quickly agreed that the European system should include a
clause preventing patents that were contrary to public policy or
morality. 11 This was done without any significant discussion on the
matter, suggesting that the public policy and morality clause was
uncontroversial and obvious to the contracting parties. 12 Ultimately,
the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual
property to date, 13 the TRIPS agreement of 1994, incorporated
an optional “ordre public” clause to exclude the granting
of immoral patents. 14 This was signed by all 182 World Trade
Organization countries. 15
B. Moral Utility in the United States
Moral utility in the United States can be traced back to Justice
Joseph Story, “one of the architects of American patent law.” 16 In the
1817 case of Lowell v. Lewis, 17 he implemented the European-derived
rule of moral utility as a bar to patentability. In Lowell, the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant’s pump had to be “a better pump than the
common pump” to be “useful.” 18 Setting a baseline for utility, Justice
Story affirmed the issuance of the patent, stating, “All that the law
requires is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to
the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society. The word
‘useful,’ therefore, is incorporated into the [Patent Act of 1793]
in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral.” 19 Justice
Story cited several inventions that would fail the moral utility

11. Id. at 325.
12. Id.
13. Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org
/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
14. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 62 (2000).
15. Id. at 9.
16. Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law, 5 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 254, 254 (1961) (noting that it is “often said that Story was one of the architects
of American patent law”).
17. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568), abrogation
recognized by In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
18. Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
19. Id.
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bar— inventions that “poison people,” “promote debauchery,” or
“facilitate private assassination.” 20
Later, Justice Story reaffirmed his interpretation of the moral
utility requirement in Bedford v. Hunt: 21
[A] useful invention, in the statute, is . . . such a one as may be
applied to some beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an
invention, which is injurious to the morals, the health, or the good
order of society. . . . It is sufficient, that it has no obnoxious or
mischievous tendency, that it may be applied to practical uses, and
that so far as it is applied, it is salutary. If its practical utility be very
limited, it will follow, that it will be of little or no profit to the
inventor; and if it be trifling, it will sink into utter neglect. The
law . . . simply requires, that it shall be capable of use, and that the
use is such as sound morals and policy do not discountenance
or prohibit. 22

Justice Story’s interpretation was generally adopted to invalidate
immoral patents over the next century and a half. 23 Courts used the
doctrine of moral utility to invalidate patents in two main categories:
gambling devices (those “injurious” to the morals of society)
and fraudulent or deceptive devices (inventions with a
“mischievous tendency”). 24
1. Gambling devices were generally deemed immoral
The whittling away of the moral utility doctrine generally
corresponds with the widespread public acceptance of gambling. 25 In
the early years of the American moral utility doctrine, courts
invalidated patents for gambling even if they were capable of

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217).
Id.
“For many years, the Story view of utility . . . was generally accepted by the courts.”
1 CHISUM, supra note 7, § 4.02.
24. Id. § 4.03; Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37.
25. Laura A. Keay, Morality’s Move Within U.S. Patent Law: From Moral Utility to Subject
Matter, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 409, 411 (2012) (asserting that “the [moral utility] doctrine’s decline
correlates with increased public acceptance of gambling activities”).
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substantial use apart from gambling situations. 26 Throughout the
1880s and 1890s courts denied patents for slot machines and punchboard lottery devices. 27 Interestingly, the public sentiment against
gambling rose to such heights that “[b]y 1910 virtually all forms of
gambling were prohibited in the [United States].” 28 Later, however,
gambling found greater acceptance as a form of economic stimulus
during the Great Depression and was once again permitted. 29 In 1977,
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences disregarded the
application of moral utility to gambling inventions. 30 On the other
hand, the prohibition on fraudulent and deceptive inventions lasted
longer than the prohibition on gambling inventions, as I will discuss
in the next section.
2. Throughout much of early American law, fraudulent and deceptive
patents were prohibited as immoral
Like gambling patents, fraudulent and deceptive patents were not
allowed throughout much of the history of American patent law. The
first instance in which the Supreme Court invalidated a patent based
on deceptiveness was Klein v. Russel (1873). 31 The patent at issue
claimed a process for treating lamb and sheep skin to imitate the
softness of “dogskin” 32 in gloves. 33 The patent intended to substitute
a less valuable article (sheep skin) for dogskin and impose this
impression upon the public by “representing gloves made of softened
sheep and lamb skins as dogskin gloves.” 34 In affirming the

26. See, e.g., Nat’l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 90 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889)
(denying patent on toy horse race course because it was used in bar-rooms and saloons and “no
[other] such use has been as yet made”).
27. 1 CHISUM, supra note 7, § 4.03.
28. ROGER DUNSTAN, GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA, at II-6 (1997), https://www.library.
ca. gov/CRB/97/03/97003a.pdf; see also Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law®: The
International Law of Remote Wagering, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1159, 1162–1163 (2007)
(recounting the three “waves” of legalized gambling in U.S. history).
29. DUNSTAN, supra note 28.
30. Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 29, 1977).
31. Klein v. Russell, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 433 (1873).
32. The leather made from the skin of dogs. Dogskin, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dogskin (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
33. Klein, 86 U.S. at 445.
34. Id.
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invalidation of the patent, the Court also affirmed the trial court’s jury
instructions that “[i]f the process patented cannot be made useful for
any honest purpose, and can be used only for perpetrating a fraud
upon the public, and is therefore not useful, but pernicious, the
plaintiff cannot recover.” 35
In time, the deceptive patent assessment was modified by the
Rickard doctrine in Rickard v. Du Bon (1900). 36 The patent in
question revealed a process for artificially producing spots on tobacco
leaves that were used to wrap cigars. The inventor touted the process
as producing superior burning quality for the leaf, but ultimately the
Second Circuit found the only usefulness of the invention was to
“counterfeit the [superior Sumatra] leaf spotted by natural causes.”37
The Second Circuit held the patent was invalid for lack of utility and
laid forth the Rickard doctrine:
In authorizing patents to the authors of new and useful discoveries
and inventions, congress did not intend to extend protection to
those which confer no other benefit upon the public than the
opportunity of profiting by deception and fraud. To warrant a
patent, the invention must be useful; that is, capable of some
beneficial use as distinguished from a pernicious use. 38

Unlike the invalidation of some gambling patents, which were
invalidated even if they contained a non-pernicious utility, the Rickard
doctrine does not apply to patents that confer some utility other than
deception. 39 In other words, under the Rickard doctrine,
deceptiveness will not spoil a patent if the patent contains some other
non-deceptive use. In that case, it seems the deceptive claim is
immaterial to the patentability of an invention because, were it not for
the bona fide beneficial use contained within the patent, the deceptive
feature, by itself, would not be patentable.
Intuitively, a purely deceptive improvement should not be
patentable. This makes sense even with a contemporary analysis. The

35. Id. at 445, 468.
36. Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868 (2d Cir. 1900).
37. Id. at 869–72.
38. Id. at 873.
39. Patents that contain “some beneficial use” will not fail for having “no other benefit
upon the public than the opportunity of profiting by deception.” Id.
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leading patent law treatise, Chisum on Patents, begrudgingly
acknowledges the prospect of such a patent. 40 Some senior patent
examiners today, who are not aware of the moral utility doctrine, do
not believe that a competent patent examiner would grant a deceptive
patent 41 because it runs contrary to patent law’s supreme purpose: “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 42 Yet, the Federal
Circuit opened up the possibility of such patents in the landmark case
Juicy Whip I. 43
III. JUICY WHIP I
In 1999, 180 years of American moral utility doctrine precedent44
were abandoned in a seemingly innocuous case involving a juice
dispenser: 45 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (“Juicy Whip I”). 46
A. Juicy Whip Patent Claims
The juice dispenser assessed in Juicy Whip I (shown in Figure 1)
incorporates aspects of a post-mix and pre-mix juice machine. A “postmix” beverage dispenser stores beverage syrup concentrate and water
separately until they are mixed shortly before the drink is dispensed.
On the other hand, a “pre-mix” dispenser contains water and syrup
concentrate pre-mixed in a clear bowl, ready to be dispensed. 47 A premix dispenser prompts impulse buying by providing the consumer
with a visual beverage display. However, this benefit comes at a cost:
40. Refusing to give full weight to the Juicy Whip I decision, Chisum on Patents notes,
“[A]n invention the only use of which is to deceive or commit fraud has been deemed to lack
utility, but the Federal Circuit’s decision in Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, Inc. (1999), cast doubt
on that proposition.” 1 CHISUM, supra note 7, § 4.03(2).
41. Personal conversation with Denver Senior Patent Examiners (Aug. 2016).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
43. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (Juicy Whip I), 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
44. This is the period from Justice Story’s pronouncement in Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas.
1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568) to Juicy Whip I, 185 F.3d 1364. But see Ulrich Schatz,
Patents and Morality, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, PATENTS AND MORALITY 159, 159 (Sigrid Sterckx
ed., 1997) (asserting that barring the patenting of inventions that are contrary to public order
and morality is “as old as patent law itself”).
45. But see 1 CHISUM, supra note 7, § 4.03(2) (noting that Juicy Whip I “cast doubt” on
the proposition that a device to commit fraud lacks utility).
46. Juicy Whip I, 185 F.3d at 1364.
47. Id. at 1365.
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pre-mix dispensers require not only constant refilling, because the premix bowl has limited volume, but also frequent, laborious cleaning
because the juice within the bowl is more vulnerable to bacterial
contamination than juice in a post-mix dispenser. 48 The patent in Juicy
Whip I, United States Patent No. 5,575,405 (the ’405 patent),
incorporates the better qualities of both dispensers—a simulation premix bowl that appears to dispense the beverage, but does not, and a
post-mix dispenser and pressure tank below that actually dispenses the
beverage (see Figure 1). 49

48. Id.; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,575,405 col. 2 ll. 38–44, col. 3 ll. 1–6, 33–42.
49. Id. col. 5 ll. 51–62.
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Figure 1 The juice dispenser of the ’405 patent. 50 Generally,
everything above the counter [11] is the simulation pre-mix bowl and
everything below the counter is the post-mix component.

50. Id. fig. 1.
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Claims 1 and 2 of the ’405 patent state:
1. In a post-mix beverage dispenser of the type having an outlet for
discharging beverage components in predetermined proportions to
provide a serving of dispensed beverage, the improvement
which comprises:
a transparent bowl having no fluid connection with the outlet and
visibly containing a quantity of fluid;
said fluid being resistant to organic growth and simulating the
appearance of the dispensed beverage;
said bowl being positioned relative to the outlet to create the visual
impression that said bowl is the reservoir and principal source of the
dispensed beverage issuing from the outlet; and
said bowl and said quantity of fluid visible within said bowl
cooperating to create the visual impression that multiple servings of
the dispensed beverage are stored within said bowl.
2. The post-mix dispenser of claim 1 which further comprises means
for generating visible movement of said fluid in said bowl. 51

The sole inventive aspect of the ’405 patent is the combination
pre-mix simulation with the post-mix dispensing mechanism—the
illusionary aspect. All other aspects draw upon prior scientific
knowledge. Specifically, the first post-mix soda-fountain was patented
by William Gee in 1875, 52 and pre-mix dispensers have existed at least
since the invention of beer barrel taps. Likewise, although having
liquid in the pre-mix bowl that is “resistant to organic growth” seems
innovative, it is specious. Both methods specified by the ’405 patent
by which the fluid could be resistant to organic growth were long since
known at the time of filing. Claims 4 and 5 teach that resistance to
organic growth can be achieved either by sterilizing the liquid or by
using an alcohol. 53 First, sterilization of a liquid is a process dating
back to Louis Pasteur’s discovery in 1861 that heating milk and other
liquids could kill harmful bacteria, a process appropriately named

51.
52.
53.

754
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“pasteurization.” 54 Furthermore, Pasteur also proved that a closed
environment, such as the sealed 55 pre-mix bowl in the ’405 patent,
would not culture any bacteria. 56 Second, preventing bacterial growth
by using alcohol to disrupt the cell membranes and denature proteins
of vegetative bacterial cells was a method employed as early as
200 AD. 57
Ultimately, the primary purpose of the ’405 patent is to trick
consumers into thinking they are receiving something that they are
not. It gives the appearance of dispensing unadulterated, natural juice
but only dispenses canned concentrate. In the preferred embodiment
of the ’405 patent, the pre-mix bowl would hold antifreeze fluid 58 with
a dye to simulate any color of liquid desirable. 59 By way of example,
the preferred embodiment lays out how the antifreeze fluid could
simulate orange juice. It states that “[t]he formulation may be
rendered cloudy and opaque by adding a suitable dispersoid . . . for
example an alkenyl modified oxyalkylene polymer to simulate a pulpy
beverage such as orange juice.” 60 However, although the appearance
of the pre-mix container would simulate a pulpy, fresh, organic orange
juice with dispersed pulp-like chemicals, the liquid coming out of the
Juicy Whip post-mix container cannot be a pulpy juice. Chemistry and
Technology of Soft Drinks and Fruit Juices, a compilation of articles
written by veteran food scientists and intended for graduate students

54. JEFFREY C. POMMERVILLE, ALCAMO’S FUNDAMENTALS OF MICROBIOLOGY: BODY
SYSTEMS EDITION 9–11, 16 (2d ed. 2013).
55. ‘405 Patent col. 5 ll. 59–62.
56. POMMERVILLE, supra note 54, at 8–11, 16.
57. JEFFREY C. POMMERVILLE, ALCAMO’S FUNDAMENTALS OF MICROBIOLOGY 211–12
(9th ed. 2011); Yosef Ali et al., Alcohols, in DISINFECTION, STERILIZATION, AND PRESERVATION
229 (Seymore S. Block ed., 5th ed. 2001); see also id. (stating that “[a]lcohol is perhaps the
oldest of antiseptic agents”).
58. ‘405 Patent col. 6 ll. 1–2 (“A preferred fluid is an alcohol, such as polypropylene
glycol by way of example.”). Antifreeze mainly consists of polyethylene glycol or polypropylene
glycol. An Introduction to Coolant Technology, RECOCHEM INC., (last visited Nov. 14, 2017),
http://www.coolantexperts.com/coolant_overview/; see also Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang,
Inc. (Juicy Whip II), 292 F.3d 728, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Well, I was speaking to Dave Fox . . .
and what he had done is said he had a fluid like an antifreeze fluid that there would be no
spoilage but looked like his fruit punch Ole drink . . . .”).
59. Juicy Whip II, 292 F.3d at 739 (testimony stating “if it was Orange Bang it would
be orange. If it was Punch Bang, it would be red”); ‘405 Patent col. 5 ll. 13–19.
60. ‘405 Patent col. 6 ll. 8–12.
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going into production, marketing, or quality control in the soft drink
industry, stipulates that
No matter how fine it is, pulp in a carbonated post-mix syrup will
inevitably lead to a blockage in the system, for it will rise to the top
in the [syrup container] and then enter the valve in a concentrated
form. Accordingly, fruit drinks must be reformulated for dispensing
by replacing conventional concentrated juices and comminutes with
61
clarified [pulpless] concentrated juice.

Natural fruit juices have a variety of health benefits, 62 and pulp is
an indicator of those benefits. 63 Nevertheless, even if the concentrate
were healthier than the natural fruit juice, consumers are entitled to
differentiate between commodities and select their product of choice.
Imitating natural, unfiltered juice, while providing something else, is
manifestly deceptive because it leads consumers to believe they are
purchasing something that they are not.
The dispensing function of the ’405 patent is also illusionary. The
’405 patent contains an agitating function to make it appear that the
pre-mix fluid is flowing out of the dispensing outlet. Claim 2 requires
that the antifreeze inside of the bowl create “visible movement,”64
which is done by creating artificial movement. The fluid is agitated by
a mechanical device to make it appear like the juice is flowing from the
transparent pre-mix bowl above the dispensing outlet when it is not. 65

61. CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY OF SOFT DRINKS AND FRUIT JUICES 365 (Philip A.
Ashurst ed., 2d ed. 2005). Note that the juice dispenser shown in the drawing and notated in
the “Description of the Preferred Embodiment” of the ‘405 patent is a carbonation-propelled
system. ‘405 Patent col. 7 ll. 20–38, fig.1. Uncarbonated juice dispensers “operate on a postmix basis, using as a ‘syrup’ aseptically filled concentrated juice (diluted to a suitable viscosity).
Sometimes a low level of sulphur dioxide is added to protect juice in the dispense valve, which
for citrus juices must be modified to cope with high pulp content.” CHEMISTRY AND
TECHNOLOGY OF SOFT DRINKS AND FRUIT JUICES, supra at 367.
62. Peggy J. Noonan, Juice Up Your Diet, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2008/
HEALTH/diet.fitness/06/11/cl.antioxidant.juices/ (last updated June 11, 2008, 9:33 AM).
63. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXAMINATION GUIDE 1-11 (2011), http
://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/trademarks/resources/ExamGuide1-11.doc (commenting on the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure §1203.02(d)(i), which stipulates,
“[A] perceived health benefit from an ingredient or feature generally supports a presumption
that the ingredient or feature is material to a consumer purchasing decision”).
64. ‘405 Patent, col. 12 ll. 41–42.
65. Id. col. 6 ll. 2–4 (stating that the preferred embodiment provides the means “for
agitating the fluid to effect the appearance that it is flowing freshly into the container).
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The agitator itself is not new, 66 but the combination of the “visual
impression that said [pre-mix] bowl is the reservoir and principle
source of the dispensed beverage” 67 combined with the agitating
function inside the bowl is the innovative aspect that the patent claims.
This is misleading and a main component of the patent’s
deceptive nature.
In summary, the preferred embodiment of the ’405 patent displays
colored antifreeze with pulp-like components to make it appear like
fresh orange juice is flowing out of the top bowl when, in fact,
concentrated, pulpless juice is flowing out of a box hidden beneath
the dispensing machine.
B. Juicy Whip Holding and Its Flaws
The Federal Circuit in Juicy Whip I never fully judged the
deceptiveness of the ’405 dispenser, partly because the appellees
seeking to invalidate the patent, Orange Bang, did not assert the facts
stated above. 68 Even so, the court stated in dicta that “even if the use
of a reservoir containing fluid that is not dispensed is considered
deceptive, that is not by itself sufficient to render the invention
unpatentable.” 69 In a brief line of reasoning the court cited two
rationales: first, it is not unusual for a product to appear to be
something it is not, and second, the Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) is not entrusted to be arbiters of deceptive trade practices,
a responsibility that the court thought should be left to the Federal
Trade Commission or the Food and Drug Administration.70
Ultimately, the court’s holding expressed a deferral of responsibility
and a metaphorical “washing of hands”:
Of course, Congress is free to declare particular types of
inventions unpatentable for a variety of reasons, including

66. Disclosure of the patent reveals that agitators have been used in an assortment of premix machines. Id. col. 3 l. 20.
67. Id. col. 12 ll. 33–35.
68. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (Juicy Whip I), 185 F.3d 1364, 1367–68 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (“Orange Bang has not argued that it is unlawful to display a representation of the
beverage in the manner that fluid is displayed in the reservoir of the invention, even though the
fluid is not what the customer will actually receive.”).
69. Id. at 1368.
70. Id. at 1367–68.
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deceptiveness. . . . Until such time as Congress does so, however, we
find no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled
unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they have the capacity
to fool some members of the public. 71

In the following paragraphs, I will explain why the court’s holding
in Juicy Whip I was incorrect, as a matter of both law and public policy.
First, the ’405 patent fails the Rickard doctrine because it confers no
other benefit than deception and fraud. Second, the ’405 patent
exploits an especially pernicious type of deception—point-of-sale
deception. Third, the USPTO is a capable arbiter of deceptive trade
practices, as they already regulate deceptive trademarks. Fourth,
deceptive patents fly in the face of First Amendment case law that
affords no protection to deceptive commercial speech.
1. The ’405 patent fails the Rickard doctrine
As discussed above, the ’405 patent employs two deceptive
mechanisms: (1) a concoction of artificial elements in the pre-mix
bowl gives the appearance that fresh, unadulterated juice will dispense
out of the reservoir and (2) an agitator function simulates flow such
that the consumer believes pre-mix liquid is flowing into his cup. In
total, the ‘405 patent confers no benefit other than deception.
It should be mentioned that the ’405 patent could, apart from the
preferred embodiment, function in a minimally deceptive way. For
example, if an owner of the ’405 dispenser stored the same artificial
juice in the pre-mix bowl as that coming from the post-mix dispenser,
customers would be ignorant only as to the inner-workings of the juice
dispenser. Customers would get the juice they wanted (artificial juice),
just not in the manner they assumed. The company has no intention
of deceiving customers in this scenario, and giving the court the
benefit of the doubt, this might be what the Federal Circuit had in
mind when it assessed the ’405 Patent; 72 however, if that was the case,
the court should not have labeled the ’405 Patent as a deceptive

71. Id. at 1368.
72. Id. at 1367–68 (“Orange Bang has not argued that it is unlawful to display a
representation of the beverage in the manner that fluid is displayed in the reservoir of the
invention, even though the fluid is not what the customer will actually receive.”).
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invention, 73 nor should it have overturned the Rickard doctrine or
engaged in a deceptiveness analysis. Multiple legitimate products fit
into a general class of inventions that, in a broad sense, ‘fool some
members of the public’ only because the consumer is unaware of the
product’s functionality. For example, the large majority of automobile
owners and technology users have no idea how their product works,
only that it produces the result they desire. 74 Yet, no one would
justifiably classify those products as “deceptive.” In essence, the
court’s use of the word “deceptive” was a misnomer. Granted, the
least deceptive use of the juice dispenser is not extremely pernicious,
but allowing all deceptive patents, even extremely pernicious patents,
because the ’405 patent is innocuous is shortsighted.
This critique aside, the ‘405 patent, as understood by the court,
fails the Rickard doctrine because it has no use besides a
pernicious use.
2. Imitative deception is particularly pernicious at the point of sale
In stating that it is common for products to appear as something
they are not—the Federal Circuit’s first rationale in concluding that
the ‘405 patent is a permissible deception—the court neglected to
distinguish between pernicious and non-pernicious consumer
deception. The court referenced several imitative products to buoy
their argument: cubic zirconium is designed to imitate a diamond,
imitation gold leaf is designed to simulate real gold leaf, synthetic
fabrics are designed to simulate expensive natural fabrics, imitation
leather is designed to look like genuine leather, laminate flooring is
designed to look like hardwood flooring, and imitation hamburgers
are designed to look like real hamburgers. 75
Although the court did not specify when the imitation was
occurring, each favorable instance the court utilized is, essentially, an
example of “post-sale confusion” that is unrelated to the type of

73. Id. at 1368 (“Moreover, even if the use of a reservoir containing fluid that is not
dispensed is considered deceptive, that is not by itself sufficient to render the
invention unpatentable.”)
74. In that case, the product is just a “black box” to those consumers, where they put
something into the device and it spits something out.
75. Id. at 1367–68.
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deception resulting from the Juicy Whip I dispenser. Post-sale
confusion, a concept employed mainly in the context of trademark law,
is confusion by the general public after a sale has occurred. This differs
from “point of sale” confusion, where the purchaser is confused as to
the source and quality of the product when the purchase is made. For
example, post-sale confusion might occur if an auto-body mechanic
accepted orders to re-shape a Pontiac to imitate the body style of a
limited edition Ferrari. 76 The consumer who requested the alterations
would know exactly where the car was initially manufactured, but as it
is driven down the road the general public may be deceived into
thinking it is a Ferrari because of its strikingly similar body style. 77 In
other words, post-sale confusion occurs when the purchaser of a good
is not confused as to the source or quality of the good at the time of
purchase, but others who see the product later are confused
or misled. 78
The important distinction between these two types of confusion
is that the imitative usefulness of the products cited by the Juicy Whip
I court (cubic zirconium, laminate flooring, imitation leather) occurs
after the purchase has been made. A cubic zirconium ring may be
useful in intimating to friends and colleagues that a person can afford
a diamond much more expensive than they actually can. However, the
buyer of a diamond ring would be thoroughly distraught to discover
that the stone is actually cubic zirconium, possessing only a fraction of
the value and quality the buyer had assumed. 79 True, synthetic fabrics
and laminate flooring are useful in their imitative form, possessing
tensile strength and hardness, but their imitative usefulness is nullified
if the consumer cannot differentiate qualities of products at the point
of sale. This is the distinction the court should have drawn: many
products have imitative usefulness outside of the point of sale, but the
imitative usefulness is negated when it deceives customers as they are

76. Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1238 (6th Cir. 1991).
77. Id. at 1243.
78. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 23:5 (4th ed. 2011).
79. See Guides for the Jewelry, Precious Metals, and Pewter Industries, 16 C.F.R. § 23.1
(2017) (“It is unfair or deceptive to misrepresent the type, kind, grade, quality, quantity, metallic
content, size, weight, cut, color, character, treatment, substance, durability, serviceability, origin,
price, value, preparation, production, manufacture, distribution, or any other material aspect of
an industry product.”).
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purchasing those products. True, point-of-sale deception may increase
sales, but as a matter of public policy, laws generally favor protecting
buyers over sellers. 80
The court tried to rationalize the point-of-sale deception by
casting the ’405 patent as a post-mix machine imitating a pre-mix
machine, 81 but the relevant customers are not buying the machine,
they are buying the juice within the machine. Furthermore, even if
purchasers were buying the machine, they would be displeased to
discover that they were deceived at the point of sale, and what they
thought to be a pre-mix dispenser was actually a post-mix dispenser in
disguise. Either way, the imitative usefulness is virtually nullified if the
customer cannot evaluate the qualities of the product they are buying
at the point of sale.
Thus, the imitative nature of the ’405 dispenser is unlike the
simulative products the court cited, because it produces deception at
the point of sale.
3. Current practices demonstrate the USPTO is a capable arbiter of
deceptive trade practices
The court in Juicy Whip I reasoned that the USPTO is not charged
to be the arbiter of deceptive trade practices, but by doing so, the
court disregarded trademark law, the Federal Circuit’s own deceptive
trademark analysis, appropriate jurisdictional scope, and the
constitutional authority granted by the Intellectual Property Clause.
First, the USPTO is entrusted to prevent consumer deception
explicitly by trademark statute. In the Lanham Act, Congress gave the
USPTO the right to refuse registration of trademarks that are
“immoral” or “deceptive,” 82 and deceptive trademarks may be

80. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (“The
law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is
with protecting consumers from confusion as to source. While that concern may result in the
creation of ‘quasi-property rights’ in communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of
consumers, not the protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation.”).
81. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (Juicy Whip I), 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (“Thus, in this case the claimed post-mix dispenser meets the statutory requirement
of utility by embodying the features of a post-mix dispenser while imitating the visual appearance
of a pre-mix dispenser.”).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
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canceled in a proceeding with the USPTO at any time. 83 The Federal
Circuit affirmed this practice as recently as December 2015:
Under the Lanham Act, the PTO must register source-identifying
trademarks unless the mark falls into one of several categories of
marks precluded from registration. . . . Many of these categories bar
the registration of deceptive or misleading speech, because such
speech actually undermines the interests served by trademark
protection and, thus, the Lanham Act’s purposes in providing for
registration. For example, a mark may not be registered if it
resembles a registered mark such that its use is likely to “cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,” § 2(d), or if it is
“deceptively misdescriptive,” § 2(e). These restrictions on
registration of deceptive speech do not run afoul of the First
Amendment. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (“The government may ban
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to
inform it.”). 84

In re Budge provides the prototypical example of a deceptive
trademark. 85 In this case a company appealed a rejection for
registration by the USPTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board for
their mark “LOVEE LAMB.” 86 Although the name implied natural
materials made of sheepskin, the company sold only synthetic
automotive seat covers. 87 Due to its deceptive nature, the court found
the mark deceptively misdescriptive. 88 Furthermore, by building upon
two tests formulated by the USPTO’s Trademark Board, the court set

83. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012).
84. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). The Supreme
Court recently reviewed In re Tam, striking down the “disparagement” clause of the Lanham
Act as a violation of the First Amendment. However, in doing so, the Supreme Court implicitly
ratified the Lanham Act’s prohibition on deceptive trademarks. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct.
1744, 1753 (2017) (“[A] trademark cannot be registered if it is ‘merely descriptive or
deceptively misdescriptive’ of goods, § 1052(e)(1), or if it is so similar to an already registered
trademark or trade name that it is ‘likely . . . to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive,’ § 1052(d).”)
85. In re Budge Mfg., 857 F.2d 773 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
86. Id. at 774.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 775–77.
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forth the current test for deceptiveness in trademarks. 89 In other
words, the Federal Circuit has relied upon the USPTO’s own
arbitration of deceptive trade practices to formulate its standard for
deceptive trade practices. 90 Declaring that the USPTO is not
directed to or capable of assessing deceptive trade practices is
historically inaccurate.
The Juicy Whip I court asserted that the USPTO is not designated
as an arbiter of deceptive trade practices, but the USPTO
accomplished that directive in the realm of patents for 180 years
before Juicy Whip I, with no disapproval from Congress. The fact that
Congress chose not to alter the moral utility doctrine in the many
revisions to the Patent Act from 1790 to 1950 is compelling evidence
that the USPTO is a capable arbiter of deceptive trade practices. 91
Third, if deceptive patents like those in Juicy Whip I were policed
by the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug
Administration, as the court suggests, it would blur jurisdictional
lines. The Supreme Court has indicated that it is not the prerogative
of the Federal Trade Commission to invalidate patents. 92
Furthermore, a deceptive patent would be enjoined only if it was
exceptionally bad, such that it caught the attention of those federal
agencies. 93 On the other hand, it would not require much more of a
89. Id. at 775; In re Shapely, Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 72, 73 (T.T.A.B.
1986); In re Simmons, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 331 (T.T.A.B. 1976). The benchmark for
deceptiveness in trademarks is “(1) Is the term misdescriptive of the character, quality, function,
composition or use of the goods? (2) If so, are prospective purchasers likely to believe that the
misdescription actually describes the goods? (3) If so, is the misdescription likely to affect the
decision to purchase?” Budge, 857 F.2d at 775. With some modification, this test could be
applied to deceptive patent applications.
90. Budge, 857 F.2d at 775.
91. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 636 (2010) (noting that “the Patent Act was
amended, revised or codified some 50 times between 1790 and 1950” (citing Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966))).
92. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2243 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Our
cases establish that antitrust law has no business prying into a patent settlement so long as that
settlement confers to the patent holder no monopoly power beyond what the patent itself
conferred—unless, of course, the patent was invalid, but that again is a question of patent law,
not antitrust law.”).
93. See Thomas B. Pahl, Stick with Security: Insights into FTC Investigations, FTC (July
21, 2017, 10:57 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/07
/stick-security-insights-ftc-investigations (“We like to think of the FTC as a small federal agency
that – in appropriate circumstances – can pack a powerful law enforcement punch. But we’re
always conscious of the need to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars. Sometimes a company’s
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USPTO examiner to concurrently assess the deceptive nature of an
invention while assessing novelty, obviousness, patentable subject
matter, and utility in general. Patent examiners become intimately
familiar with technologies as they assess them over months or years,
and the deceptive nature of a patent should be evident to the
ordinary examiner.
Finally, patent examiners have greater constitutional authority to
assess deceptive patents than trademark examiners. Trademark law,
wherein the USPTO currently assesses deceptive trade practices, is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but draws its legitimacy from
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. This clause is a broad
authorization that has been used to justify regulations applicable to
everything from racial discrimination 94 to homegrown marijuana. 95 In
contrast, the utility requirement for patents and copyrights is explicit
in the Constitution: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .” 96 As
discussed above, point-of-sale deception does not convey any
usefulness or utility as required by the Constitution. When something
is explicitly found in the Constitution, it receives more deference than
ordinary congressional directives. 97 Accordingly, the USPTO should
be given the authority to evaluate usefulness and invalidate deceptive
patent applications.
The USPTO is a capable arbiter of deceptive trade practices as
shown by trademark law, the federal circuit’s deceptiveness analysis
formulated from the USPTO’s deceptiveness analysis, and the
USPTO’s constitutional and jurisdictional scope to grant and
invalidate patents.

practices may raise initial concerns, but there are other factors that suggest law enforcement
wouldn’t be in the public interest.”).
94. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
95. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
97. Id. art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added) (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
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4. Deceptive patents are a loophole in the laws seeking to prevent
consumer deception
The foremost point the court makes in Juicy Whip I is that
“Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions unpatentable
for a variety of reasons, including deceptiveness.” 98 Although
Congress has not spoken specifically about deceptiveness in patent
utility, a significant amount of federal code, regulation, and case law is
devoted to eliminating deceptive trade practices similar to those
implicated in Juicy Whip I and will be discussed hereinafter. Allowing
the USPTO to invalidate deceptive patents would be consistent with
the congressional intent and policy objectives indicated in
these enactments.
a. Federal laws seek to prevent consumer deception. As part of federal
Trademark law, Congress enacted 15 U.S.C. § 1125, which makes a
person liable in a civil action if they “in connection with any goods or
services . . . use[] . . . any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her
or another person’s goods.” 99 This is the very center of Trademark law,
the prevention of consumer confusion. 100
Furthermore, in 1967 Congress enacted the Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act (FPLA) to protect customers in the marketing of
consumer goods. 101 In the declaration of policy, Congress proclaimed
that “[i]nformed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient
functioning of a free market economy. Packages and their labels
should enable consumers to obtain accurate information as to the
quantity of the contents and should facilitate value comparisons.”102

98. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (Juicy Whip I), 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012).
100. “Likelihood of confusion” is the central test for common-law and statutory
trademark infringement. The test is whether the use of the trademark is likely to cause confusion,
to cause mistake, or to deceive. MCCARTHY, supra note 78, § 23:1.
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1461 (2012).
102. Id. § 1451.
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Although this Act excludes unpackaged goods, 103 such as the juice in
the ’405 patent, the wording conveys what appears to be Congress’s
wide-ranging goal—“to prevent the deception of consumers or to
facilitate value comparisons as to any consumer commodity.”104
Although it is true that Congress has not spoken specifically
concerning the moral utility of patents, the reasoning in Juicy Whip I
that Congress is free to enact a law to prevent deceptive patents
ignores other laws Congress has already enacted.
b. Federal regulations seek to prevent consumer deception. Along
with Congress’s laws to prevent consumer deception, many
regulations have been enacted to prevent consumer deception in a
wide array of industries. 105 Analogous to the soft-drink industry and
the ‘405 patent, regulations have been enacted to curb deception in
the advertising of distilled spirits. The code specifies that:
An advertisement of distilled spirits shall not contain:
....
(h) Deceptive advertising techniques. Subliminal or similar
techniques are prohibited. “Subliminal or similar techniques,” as
used in this part, refers to any device or technique that is used to
convey, or attempts to convey, a message to a person by means of
images or sounds of a very brief nature that cannot be perceived at a
normal level of awareness. 106

The visual display bowl in the ‘405 patent is a veritable
advertisement for the drink that is dispensed: “a message to a person
by means of images.” 107 Although the court is not bound by this

103. Id. § 1459.
104. Id. § 1454.
105. See, e.g., Guides for the Nursery Industry, 16 C.F.R. §§ 18.1–.8 (2017) (preventing
deceptive practices in the nursery industry); Guides for the Rebuilt, Reconditioned and Other
Used Automobile Parts Industry, 16 C.F.R. §§ 20.1–.3 (2017) (deception in the used
automobile parts industry); Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.1–.5 (2017) (addressing deception in endorsements and
testimonials in advertising); Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R.
§§ 260.1–.17 (2017) (deception in environmental marketing); Funeral Industry Practices, 16
C.F.R. §§ 453.3–.8 (2017) (addressing deception in funeral industry practices).
106. Advertising of Distilled Spirits, 27 C.F.R. § 5.65(a), (h) (2017) (emphasis omitted);
see also Advertising of Wine, 27 C.F.R. § 4.64 (2017) (similar regulation for the advertising
of wine).
107. 27 C.F.R. § 5.65(h).
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regulation in the ‘405 Patent’s context, the court turned a blind eye
to the deceptive advertising technique in the ‘405 patent instead of
prohibiting it.
c. First Amendment case law seeks to prevent consumer deception.
The Juicy Whip invention violates First Amendment protections. The
invention 1) proposes a commercial transaction, 2) misleads the
consumer, and 3) lacks a disclaimer to dissipate potential consumer
deception. The visual display bowl of the ‘405 patent assumes the
basic features of an advertisement. As stated in the ‘405 patent
disclosure, the pre-mix bowl is a “visual beverage display that
is a powerful merchandising tool for stimulating impulse
buying.” 108 Essentially, the pre-mix bowl “propose[s] a commercial
transaction,” 109 which is a signifier of commercial speech and deserves
a separate First Amendment analysis. 110 Normally, speech that is false
is protected by the First Amendment unless the speaker is motivated
by actual malice; 111 however, commercial speech that is false and
misleading is wholly unprotected. 112 This type of speech, found in
commercial advertising, is designated as “lower value” speech. 113 It
receives less protection than political speech or even hate speech
because it is much easier to verify. A person who creates and advertises
a product knows its specifications and, as such, incurs greater liability
for propagating falsity. 114

108. U.S. Patent No. 5,575,405 col. 1 ll. 47–49.
109. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973).
110. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562 (1980).
111. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
112. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 777–
78 (1976). Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (“The evils of false
commercial speech, which may have an immediate harmful impact on commercial transactions,
together with the ability of purveyors of commercial speech to control falsehoods, explain why
we tolerate more governmental regulation of this speech than of most other speech.”).
113. See Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV.
2166 (2015).
114. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. 425 U.S. at 777–78 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(“The advertiser’s access to the truth about his product and its price substantially eliminates any
danger that governmental regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will chill
accurate and nondeceptive commercial expression. There is, therefore, little need to sanction
some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”).
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The doctrine that “the Constitution accords less protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms
of expression” is telling. 115 Politically false statements and hate speech
are accepted in the marketplace of ideas with the presumption that the
truth will eventually rise to the top, but this is not tolerated in the
marketplace of ideas for commercial speech. This is due to the
government’s substantial interest in facilitating commerce by
“insuring [sic] that the stream of commercial information flow[s]
cleanly as well as freely.” 116
In Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 117 the Supreme Court set forth a seminal test
for assessing the protections afforded to commercial speech. The
analysis balances the nature of the speech and the government interest
asserted. 118 However, the test completely excludes commercial speech
that is false, illegal, or deceptive, concluding that “[t]he government
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public
than to inform it.” 119 If the court would have applied the First
Amendment in Juicy Whip I, the ‘405 patent’s ability to deceptively
advertise and propose a commercial transaction would likely have
been forbidden.
Finally, as demonstrated by the requirements in the Fair Packaging
and Labeling Act above, Congress may compel speech in certain
circumstances, even though “compelling speech raises a First
Amendment issue just as much as restricting speech.” 120 In the
commercial context, the government can compel speech because “the
extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such
speech provides.” 121 There is little value in consumer deception, hence
“warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in
115. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1983).
116. Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 772.
117. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y, 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
118. Id. at 563.
119. Id. at 563–64.
120. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 505 (1997) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
121. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985).
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order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or
deception.” 122 As discussed in the following paragraph, the inventors
of the ‘405 patent thought to use a disclaimer with their invention but
chose not to do so.
After Juicy Whip I, a second suit ensued seeking to invalidate the
‘405 patent for, among other grounds, inequitable conduct (“Juicy
Whip II”). 123 Originally, after a phone conversation with the California
Department of Health Services, the inventors of the ‘405 juice
dispenser intended to put a disclaimer on the pre-mix juice bowl
because they were concerned “that the department [of Health
Services] would have an objection to the dispenser because of
potential consumer confusion.” 124 Gus Stratton, one of the inventors
of the ‘405 dispenser, 125 drafted a letter to the California Department
of Health Services stating that a disclaimer sticker would be placed on
the bowl indicating that the liquid in the clear bowl is “for advertising
purposes only,” with a sketch of a dispenser included in the letter.126
However, the letter was never mailed, and the examining USPTO
officer never received a copy of it. 127 The court in Juicy Whip II did
not find this evidence probative because, as they concluded in Juicy
Whip I, “an invention’s deceptive nature has no bearing upon its
utility.” 128 However, this indicates the inventors of the ‘405 patent
comprehended the marketing nature 129 of the juice dispenser. The
clear pre-mix bowl functioned as nothing more than a visual
advertisement, and it should have been treated as such.
Had the court assessed the speech value of the clear pre-mix bowl
it would have applied intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech
based upon the visual advertising functions of the bowl, 130 and it

122. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982).
123. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (Juicy Whip II), 292 F.3d 728 (2002).
124. Id. at 735.
125. U.S. Patent No. 5,575,405.
126. Juicy Whip II, 292 F.3d at 735.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 745.
129. U.S. Patent No. 5,575,405 col. 1 ll. 47–49 (stating that a pre-mix bowl is a “visual
beverage display that is a powerful merchandising tool for stimulating impulse buying”).
130. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) (“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational
function of advertising.”).
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would have found that it was unprotected commercial speech because
of its misleading and deceptive nature—step one of the Central
Hudson analysis. 131 In other words, the deceptive simulating function
of the pre-mix bowl could have been prohibited because “there can
be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful
activity.” 132
In sum, the Juicy Whip invention directly runs afoul of First
Amendment protection: 1) the pre-mix bowl operates as an
advertising mechanism that proposes a transaction, 2) the
advertisement is misleading, and 3) no warning or disclaimer is used
to correct its misleading nature.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY
Deceptive patents should be prohibited, for one reason, because
they counteract the utilitarian objectives of patent law. It is broadly
accepted that the purpose of the patent system is utilitarian—to
promote innovation. 133 To achieve this purpose, a simple quid pro quo
is required: a quasi-monopoly is created in exchange for the usefulness
of the invention. The invention is useful in itself, in that it allows the
public access to buy and use it, but the disclosure also advances the
progress of science by disseminating how to create or practice the
invention. This balance of interests between incentives for the inventor
and benefits to the public is something that the legislature has
grappled with for some time. 134
Thomas Jefferson, although uncomfortable with granting limited
monopolies, conceded to the idea upon a utilitarian basis. In
correspondence with James Madison in 1788 Jefferson wrote: “[I]t is
better to . . . abolish . . . Monopolies, in all cases, than not to do it in
any . . . . The saying there shall be no monopolies lessens the
131. Id.
132. Id. (“The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the
public than to inform it.”).
133. David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 182–83 (2009).
134. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 636 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he Patent
Act was amended, revised, or codified some fifty times between 1790 and 1950” (quoting
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966))).
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incitements to ingenuity, which is spurred on by the hope of a
monopoly for a limited time, as of 14. [sic] years . . . .” 135 Madison
replied, “With regard to Monopolies they are justly classed among the
greatest nusances [sic] in Government. But is it clear that as
encouragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are
not too valuable to be wholly renounced?” 136 Later, Jefferson stated
the rationalization of granting patents as “drawing a line between the
things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an
exclusive patent, and those which are not.” 137 Surely if commerciallysound inventions are hardly worth the embarrassment of an exclusive
patent, deceptive patents are not.
Ultimately, the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution is
the highest authority on the utilitarian rationale of intellectual
property: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by
way of “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”138
The Constitution states the foremost purpose of intellectual property
is to promote the progress of science and useful arts, and the means
to fulfill that end is giving exclusive rights to writings or discoveries.
If the trade-off is a utilitarian one, not merely a property or
common law right, 139 what benefit is derived from a purely deceptive
invention? Where is the benefit to the deceived public? First, when
consumers are deceived, there are already increased search costs as the
consumer seeks to find out what the product actually is. Then, if

135. Letter from Jefferson to Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 440, 442–43 (Julian P. Boyd & Mina R. Bryan eds., 1956).
136. Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 16–21 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1958) (footnote omitted).
137. 13 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery
Bergh eds., 1904).
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For analysis on the context and interpretations of the
Intellectual Property Clause see Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:
Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J.
1771 (2006).
139. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 44 (3d ed. 2004)
(“Locke’s natural rights theory and its impact with respect to intellectual property is dubious.”)
For arguments that the Intellectual Property Clause is a property right see Adam Mossoff, Who
Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in
Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007). But see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 5–10 (1966).
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the consumer is deceived as to the product’s nature, there are
additional costs associated with finding the product they thought they
were purchasing in the first place. 140 If a patent is already “dead
weight” 141 on the market, to the extent that it exacts tolls from
the public, 142 must we add additional search costs by condoning
deceptive patents?
Second, it is unclear how novelty and obviousness, bars to
patentability, would be evaluated for deceptive inventions. If a solely
deceptive invention meets the standard for utility, such as the ‘405
patent in Juicy Whip I, what constitutes novelty? 143 Would the next
deceptive invention have to exceed the deceptiveness of the first to be
non-obvious? Would we assume the person having ordinary skill in the
art possesses a certain amount of malignity?
Finally, if we are “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful
Arts” through patent law, 144 is the government promoting consumer
deception? Are we seeking to progress the art of deception? Do the
makers of deceptive products deserve penalties in other areas of
commerce yet a windfall in the patent realm? It would be duplicitous
for Congress to establish trademark law to reduce consumer confusion
and deception and, on the other hand, provide incentives in patent

140. Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA.
L. REV. 67 (2012). These are search costs not for a particular brand of product, but for a
particular quality of product (natural v. artificial juice), which can be directly correlated from
trademark law into deceptive patent features.
141. Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social Benefits and Costs of the Patent System Stack Up
in Pharmaceuticals?, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 82 (2004) (“The patent system also generates
inefficiencies: The patentee’s exclusive rights permit it to charge super-competitive prices for the
patented product, with the result that some potential customers who value the invention at more
than its cost of production but at less than the price charged by the patentee go unserved. In
the language of economists, this is a deadweight loss, or a loss to society resulting from a
misallocation of resources.”).
142. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)
(emphasis added) (“Every patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the public. The
Framers plainly did not want those monopolies freely granted. The invention, to justify a patent,
had to serve the ends of science—to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like;
to make a distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge.”).
143. Bilski v. Kappos 561 U.S. 593, 655 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“As early as the
19th century, we explained that the patent laws are not intended to ‘creat[e] . . . monopolies,
which enable [inventors] to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without
contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts.’” (quoting Atlantic Works v. Brady,
107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883))).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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law to promote and encourage consumer deception. Surely, this is not
what Congress intended.
V. AGAINST REVIVING MORAL UTILITY
Of course, it is difficult to fully gauge which industries may be
affected by a change in the moral utility doctrine. After all, who could
have foreseen that a patent on a juice dispenser could undo the
longstanding moral utility doctrine. Legal commentaries often argue
for or against the implementation of moral utility in the field of
biotechnology, 145 however, depending how the moral bar to
patentability is implemented it could have broad or narrow effects on
various industries.
Two noteworthy industries that may be affected are gambling and
biotechnology. With the background presented in this paper we could
parse the moral utility doctrine into two views: an expansive view, 146
set forth by Justice Story and comprising any immoral invention, and
a restricted view, encompassing point-of-sale deception. 147 Under the
restricted view, for which this paper advocates, gambling patents are
most at risk. Yet, under a more expansive view biotechnology patents
could also be at risk.
Although only some gambling patents would be at risk, there are
major economic incentives keeping the gambling industry
undisturbed. Gambling is a mainstay for some states, such as Nevada.
It is also a very lucrative business that brings U.S. merchants $240
billion every year. 148 However, gambling machines employ various

145. A large majority of recent publications on the moral utility doctrine have focused on
biotechnology. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and
Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003); Benjamin D. Enerson, Note,
Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility
Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685 (2004); Laura A. Keay, Morality’s Move Within U.S. Patent
Law: From Moral Utility to Subject Matter, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 409, 411 (2012).
146. See supra Section II.A.
147. See supra Section III.B.2.
148. Kimberly Pierceall, The US Gambling Industry Is Worth $240 Billion, BUS. INSIDER
(Sep. 30, 2014, 5:55 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-gambling-industry-isworth-240-billion-2014-9.
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forms of psychological trickery, such as “near misses,” 149 that are
deceptive in nature. 150 Taken together, these gambling devices would
not be patentable under a restricted view of moral utility, because they
promote deception at the point of sale. 151 This measure may be fiercely
opposed by the gambling industry, but it is merely a necessary initial
step in introducing consumer protection to gambling devices. 152 After
all, a rejected patent is not the death knell for any technology, only an
indication that the technology is undeserving of a state-sanctioned
monopoly. As discussed throughout this paper, deceptive patents are
incongruous with multiple areas of the law, and their undoing justifies
the incidental effects the moral utility doctrine would have on some
gambling patents.
The primary concern associated with reviving a broad view of the
moral utility doctrine is the effect it will have on biotechnology.153
Biotechnology has evolved exponentially over the past few decades.
This has also allowed scientists to perform unimaginable tests and
perfect life-enhancing alterations, but it has also allowed scientists to
play God through cloning and gene editing technologies.154
CRISPR/CAS9, a recently discovered gene editing technique, holds

149. See generally Ferris Jabr, How the Brain Gets Addicted to Gambling, SCI. AM.
(Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-brain-gets-addictedto-gambling.
150. John Rosengren, How Casinos Enable Gambling Addicts, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/losing-it-all/505814 (explaining
that “near misses,” deliberately misleading features, are included in many gaming
machines). Nelson Rose, one of the world’s leading experts on gaming law, notes that
Nevada regulations operate on the theory that a sophisticated player would be able to
tell the real odds of winning by playing a machine long enough. The gambling
industry maintains that deceptive near misses do not occur in North American gaming
machines, but as Schüll has noted, it has developed a more narrow definition
of deceptive near misses, which still allows for ‘subliminal inducements.’
Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (“Informed choice [is] the central tenet of consumer protection, which is why
when you apply for a loan, the bank has to tell you the interest rate and how it’s calculated. It’s
why many state lotteries have to disclose their odds, and it’s why even the contests on the backs
of cereal boxes list the chances of winning a prize. Yet such essential disclosure is not required
of electronic gaming machines.”).
153. See supra note 145.
154. See David Benjamin Turitz Cox et al., Theraputic Genome Editing: Prospects and
Challenges, 21 NATURE MED. 121 (2015).
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immense promise. 155 Through this technique many, if not all, genetic
diseases could be cured, 156 but researchers could also use this
technique to form chimeras, 157 human-animal species. Thus, the
technology would have vast use in society, but it might also cross into
an unethical realm. Some think these patents should exist to promote
life-saving technologies, 158 while others argue patents are unnecessary
to promote this type of biotechnological innovation. 159 Scholars have
advocated for the revival of the moral utility doctrine to block
biotechnology patents because of their potential moral failures, 160 but
this paper strictly proposes reviving the moral utility doctrine for
deceptive patents.
Strong opinions are involved wherever morals are at issue, so there
is no “easy” answer, but this Note has sought to simplify the analysis
by analyzing a distinct subcategory: deceptive patents.
VI. CONCLUSION
The legislature or judiciary should carve out an exception to
patentability, specifically prohibiting point-of-sale deception for patent
applications. It would not be the first time the legislature has carved
out an exception, as indicated by the court in Juicy Whip I. 161 This
restriction to patentability would not be new, only a return to
principles that guided the previous 180 years of American patent law.
In part, I agree with the Juicy Whip I court. The legislature should
enact a law preventing deceptive patents. However, I do not believe
the Federal Circuit had sufficient grounds to forsake the doctrine in
the first place. Congress’s silence on the moral utility doctrine is not a
denunciation of it. Moral utility is a fundamental aspect of patent law
and can be traced to intellectual property’s very origins. It plays a
155. Id.
156. Megan Molteni, CRISPR May Cure All Genetic Disease—One Day, WIRED (June 7,
2017, 5:03 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/06/crispr-may-cure-genetic-disease-one-day.
157. Megan Molteni, First Human-Pig Chimera is a Step Toward Custom Organs, WIRED
(Jan. 26, 2017, 3:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/first-human-pig-chimera-steptoward-custom-organs/.
158. See Enerson, supra note 145, at 685.
159. See Bagley, supra note 145, at 469.
160. Id.
161. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (Juicy Whip I), 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (noting that Congress previously exempted special nuclear material and atomic
weapons from patentability).
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complementary role to other doctrines that prevent consumer
deception and should be embraced, either judicially or legislatively, as
an inherent principle of the Intellectual Property Clause.
I do not take the position that all deception is bad, only the
deception that occurs when consumers make a value judgment about
the quality of goods at the point of sale. Post-sale confusion and initial
interest confusion may serve a useful function, as the court indicated,
through imitative products such as cubic zirconium, laminate flooring,
or any number of articles brought about through the Industrial
Revolution. However, indistinguishable imitative features become
more pernicious the nearer a purchaser is to the point of sale.
Neither do I advocate the prohibition of deceptive inventions
entirely. That is not the prerogative of the Patent and Trademark
Office. That, as the court in Juicy Whip I correctly stated, is the job of
the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug
Administration, to “protect[] consumers from fraud and deception in
the sale of food products.” 162 The Patent and Trademark Office’s
responsibility is to promote the progress of science and arts. To
promote a practice is appreciably different from prohibiting a practice
or merely allowing it to occur. This is the point that the court in Juicy
Whip I failed to acknowledge: if the deceptive feature has utility to the
consumer, it will prevail without the endorsement of a quasimonopoly. A rejection to patentability is not the death knell for an
invention. In fact, the Supreme Court, and many others, have
questioned whether patents are even necessary to encourage certain
forms of innovation. 163
The Federal Circuit’s acquiescence of deceptive patents in Juicy
Whip I not only cuts against moral utility precedent and sound public
policy, but also conflicts with trademark, free speech, and federal code
prohibitions. The legislature or judiciary should take steps to
implement the deceptiveness bar to patentability to promote true

162. Id.
163. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 651 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (holding the
large majority of business methods unpatentable). “Many have expressed serious doubts about
whether patents are necessary to encourage business innovation.” Id.
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innovation, prevent dead-weight loss, and ensure that “the stream of
commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely.” 164
Paul Spiel ∗

164. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 (1976).
∗

J.D., April 2017, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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